The stainless-steel wedge on wheels has become a symbol of Elon Musk’s bravado. The man with the midas touch unveiled his Next Big Thing, and a million fans duly got in line with deposits. At the time, Tesla and it’s showman CEO could do no wrong. They were on a roll. In his own words, if nobody buys the Cybertruck, Tesla will redesign it to be more conventional. But could a redesign keep the looks whilst making it meet the road regs outside of the USA?

Fast forward to now. North American sales have now dried up and regulatory barriers block global expansion, the Cybertruck faces an existential question: can it survive beyond its niche, or is this the beginning of the end for Tesla’s most polarising product?

Welcome back to a bonus edition of the podcast. My name is Martyn Lee and when I have something which requires a deeper look, you’ll sometimes find these bonus shows showing up in your feed. Speaking of which, Patreon supporters get the bonus shows 7 days exclusively before they drop into the free feed.

 

MAKING CYBERTRUCK LEGAL IN EUROPE

Raven Seeholzer’s workshop in Basel, Switzerland represents a microcosm of the Cybertruck’s global predicament. The founder of Teslab, a used Tesla marketplace, has spent the past year disassembling a fleet of five Cybertrucks, rebuilding them from scratch to comply with European regulations. The trademark sharp edges have been blunted with rubber coverings, electrical wiring has been completely overhauled, and new front bumpers have been engineered to meet pedestrian safety standards. The vehicle, Seeholzer claims, has been “pretty much fully apart”.

This extraordinary effort — essentially re-engineering Tesla’s flagship pickup — illustrates the fundamental misalignment between the Cybertruck’s design philosophy and the regulatory realities of global automotive markets. While Seeholzer believes approval in Switzerland is merely “a matter of time”, his admission that European Union homologation would be “a lengthy process” reveals the deeper truth: the Cybertruck was never designed for the world. It was designed for America.

That strategy is not just catastrophic, but with a production line built for ten times the current utilisation rate, it’s suffocating. The Cybertruck won’t bring down Tesla, but it’s now a serious financial drag.

Sales data from 2025 paint a grim picture of a product in freefall. According to Cox Automotive, Tesla sold just 5,385 Cybertrucks in the third quarter of 2025, a precipitous 63% decline from the 14,416 units delivered in the same period of 2024. Figures through September showed only 16,097 units sold, down 38% from the comparable period in 2024. The fourth quarter brought no respite. Industry analysts estimate full-year 2025 deliveries at approximately 17,000-20,000 units — a staggering shortfall from Elon Musk’s promise that Tesla would achieve an annual production rate of 250,000 units “probably sometime in 2025”. The company has now missed that target by roughly 230,000 vehicles, representing one of the most spectacular failures to meet a CEO’s forecast in automotive history.

The Death Spiral of Demand

The sales collapse has been swift and unforgiving. Monthly delivery figures tell a story of accelerating decline rather than temporary softness. In the first quarter of 2025, Tesla sold 6,406 Cybertrucks, already half the previous quarter’s volume. By the second quarter, that figure had fallen to approximately 5,000 units. The third quarter’s 5,385 deliveries suggested stabilisation, but only at disastrously low levels. Current estimates suggest the fourth quarter saw further deterioration, potentially delivering fewer than 2,000 units. This is not a bump in the road; it is a product entering terminal decline.

The market’s verdict has been delivered through depreciation as brutal as any recall. Tesla began accepting Cybertruck trade-ins for the first time in June 2025, a telling admission that the secondary market had collapsed. One owner who purchased a Foundation Series model for $100,000 received a trade-in offer of just $65,400 after driving only 6,000 miles (9,656 km) — a 35% depreciation in less than a year. Independent platforms showed even steeper declines, with some Cybertrucks listing at 45% below original purchase price. By December 2025, auction prices had fallen into the low $60,000 range, with analyst Doug DeMuro predicting values could plummet to $35,000 within 18 months. Such catastrophic depreciation reflects not merely oversupply, but fundamental demand destruction.

Tesla’s response has been to throttle production dramatically. The company paused Cybertruck production at Gigafactory Texas in late May 2025, then again in early July. Workers reported that production targets for several Cybertruck lines had been slashed, with some lines running at “a small fraction of their previous capacity” and production teams thinned by more than half. The factory, which Tesla had equipped with capacity to produce 250,000 Cybertrucks annually, is now operating at less than 10% utilisation. This represents not merely underutilised assets, but stranded capital on an epic scale. The opportunity cost of this failed investment — both in physical infrastructure and engineering resources — will haunt Tesla’s financial performance for years.

The Competition Strikes Back

The Cybertruck’s collapse has been accelerated by the renaissance of its competitors. The Ford F-150 Lightning, once dismissed as an unambitious conversion of a petrol truck, became the undisputed leader of America’s electric pickup segment. In the third quarter of 2025, Ford sold 10,005 Lightnings, a 40% increase from the previous year. The Lightning’s success stemmed from its fundamental conservatism: it looks like a truck, functions like a truck and requires no re-engineering of American expectations about what a pickup ought to be. Yet the reason I talk about it in past tense is despite it being the top EV truck on sale, it still wasn’t enough to save the programme. The F-150 Lighting was first paused and then killed off by Ford seeking substantial savings on their EV program.

General Motors has also capitalised on the Cybertruck’s stumble. The Chevrolet Silverado EV nearly doubled its quarterly sales to 3,940 units in the third quarter, up 98% from the previous year. The GMC Sierra EV posted even more dramatic growth, selling 3,374 units — a 772% increase, albeit from a low base. Even the GMC Hummer EV lineup, a premium offering with limited volume ambitions, outsold the Cybertruck with 5,246 units in the third quarter. The competitive picture is clear: traditional automakers, leveraging decades of pickup truck expertise, have successfully electrified their offerings without alienating their core customers. Tesla, by contrast, has created a vehicle that appeals neither to traditional truck buyers nor to the mass market of EV enthusiasts.

This competitive dynamic reflects a broader truth about automotive product strategy. Ram CEO Tim Kuniskis noted in 2025 that brand loyalty within the truck segment ranges from 70% to 80%. Truck buyers, even those open to electrification, gravitate towards established nameplates that have proven their capabilities in towing, payload and durability. The Cybertruck’s pyramid-like silhouette and high-sided bed — which complicates loading — represents a fundamental misunderstanding of truck buyer priorities. As Stephanie Brinley of S&P Global Mobility observed, “pickup trucks have been a natural stronghold for American automakers” with buyers exhibiting “a high degree of conservatism”. The Cybertruck’s radical departure from established truck design has proven to be a liability, not an asset.

The Musk Factor

The Cybertruck’s sales collapse cannot be understood separately from the broader erosion of Tesla’s brand, driven primarily by Elon Musk’s polarising political activities. Research published by Yale University economists in October 2025 quantified what many had observed anecdotally: Musk’s partisan political engagement has inflicted measurable damage on Tesla’s sales. The study found that Tesla’s U.S. sales would have been 67% to 83% higher between October 2022 and April 2025 without what researchers termed “the Musk partisan effect” — translating to approximately one million to 1.26 million fewer vehicles sold. By the first quarter of 2025, the effect had intensified such that Tesla’s monthly sales would have been approximately 125% higher without Musk’s political activities.

The mechanism is straightforward: Musk’s support for Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, his $300 million in contributions to Republican candidates and his role leading the Department of Government Efficiency during Trump’s presidency alienated Tesla’s core demographic of environmentally conscious, politically liberal consumers. Analysis at county level revealed that a previously upward trend in Tesla sales among Democratic-leaning counties reversed sharply from October 2022, coinciding with Musk’s acquisition of Twitter (now X). Republican-leaning counties showed no corresponding increase in Tesla purchases, demonstrating that Musk’s political positioning lost customers without gaining offsetting support.

This partisan effect has been particularly devastating for the Cybertruck, which already faced scepticism from traditional truck buyers. The vehicle has become a lightning rod for anti-Musk sentiment, with owners reporting vandalism and hostility. Social media documentation shows Cybertrucks spray-painted with slogans like “Nazi cars”, while protests have targeted Tesla showrooms and charging stations. The Cybertruck’s distinctive appearance makes it impossible for owners to avoid association with Musk’s increasingly controversial public persona — a problem that owners of more conventional Teslas can mitigate with bumper stickers declaring “I bought this before Elon went crazy”.

The competitive implications are severe. The Yale study found that sales of competing electric and hybrid vehicles increased by approximately 17% to 22% during the same period, translating to roughly one million additional units sold by Tesla’s rivals. This represents a direct transfer of market share from Tesla to competitors, driven not by product deficiencies but by brand contamination. For the Cybertruck specifically, which never established the strong product reputation enjoyed by the Model 3 or Model Y, Musk’s political activities have proven catastrophic.

Recall Roulette

The Cybertruck’s reputation has been further undermined by an extraordinary series of recalls that have made it one of the most frequently recalled vehicles in automotive history. In less than two years since deliveries began in November 2023, the Cybertruck has been recalled ten times, an astonishing rate that suggests fundamental quality control failures. The recalls have ranged from the serious to the absurd, but all have contributed to the perception that the Cybertruck was rushed to market before it was ready.

The most recent recall, announced in October 2025, involved 6,197 Cybertrucks because of improperly installed off-road light bar accessories that could detach and create collision hazards. This followed a recall in March 2025 affecting 46,096 vehicles — nearly every Cybertruck on the road — because of exterior cant rail panels that could detach while driving. The problem stemmed from adhesive that was “prone to environmental embrittlement”, causing the stainless steel panels to fly off at motorway speeds. Earlier recalls addressed a faulty drive inverter that could cause loss of power to the wheels, a rearview camera that delayed displaying images when shifting into reverse, windshield wiper motor failures and accelerator pedals that could become dislodged and trapped by interior trim.

Perhaps most embarrassingly, the Cybertruck was recalled in January 2024 because the font size for brake, park and antilock brake system warning lights was too small to meet federal safety standards.

This recall, while minor, epitomised the rushed development process that has plagued the vehicle. Perhaps not the bloody nose of recent days where Tesla launched the Cybercab only to forget to trademark Cybercab, leaving someone else to snap it up weeks later. But it’s not how a mature automotive maker should go about its business.

The cumulative effect of these recalls has been to establish the Cybertruck as an unreliable product in the minds of potential buyers — a reputation that is nearly impossible to overcome in the conservative truck market.

Europe’s Impenetrable Fortress

The regulatory barriers preventing the Cybertruck from entering European markets are not incidental challenges but fundamental incompatibilities between American and European automotive philosophies.

European regulations prohibit vehicles with sharp edges that could harm pedestrians — a direct response to decades of research showing that vehicle design significantly affects pedestrian injury severity in collisions. The Cybertruck’s razor-sharp stainless steel edges, which caused cuts to early owners, flagrantly violate these standards. Admittedly European rules also require speed limiters on vehicles weighing over 3.5 tonnes, a category into which the Cybertruck barely fits. Germany’s denial of U.S. military personnel requests to bring personal Cybertrucks into the country explicitly cited the vehicle’s significant deviation from EU regulations.

Attempts to import Cybertrucks into Europe have been characterised by failure and controversy.

A Cybertruck seized by UK police in January 2025 was deemed not road-legal. YouTuber Yianni Charalambous imported a Cybertruck to the UK with intentions to modify it for compliance, but faced such intense backlash from local politicians demanding seizure that he eventually planned to leave the country with the vehicle. A modified Cybertruck registered in Czechia sparked a letter from safety advocates and campaigners demanding that Cybertrucks be banned from European roads entirely. James Nix of Transport & Environment, a European think-tank, stated bluntly: “When anyone examines the facts and the applicable rules, it’s clear the Cybertruck is illegal in Europe”.

Even Switzerland, which is not an EU member and thus has potentially more flexible regulations, presents formidable challenges. Seeholzer’s effort to achieve compliance illustrates the magnitude of required modifications: complete electrical system re-engineering, new bumper designs, comprehensive edge covering and extensive government testing. The weight limit of 3.5 tonnes means that compliant Cybertrucks would have severely restricted payload capacity, transforming them into what Seeholzer calls “lifestyle” vehicles incapable of performing traditional truck functions. The narrower roads common throughout Europe further constrain the 3.5-tonne Cybertruck’s practicality, while its zero to 60mph (97 km/h) time of 2.6 seconds has led some experts to compare it to “a guided missile on wheels”.

The political dimension adds another layer of complexity. A 2025 framework agreement between the U.S. and EU included commitments to standardise vehicle regulations, potentially creating a pathway for Cybertruck approval. Yet in October 2025, a coalition of European cities, non-profits and safety campaigners sent a letter to European regulators urging them to reject U.S. standards specifically to prevent “Cybertruck-style vehicles” from appearing on European roads. This organised opposition demonstrates that the Cybertruck has become a symbol of American automotive excess that European civil society is determined to resist, regardless of technical compliance efforts.

The China Conundrum

China presents a different but equally challenging barrier to Cybertruck globalisation. While Tesla has registered the Cybertruck with China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology — a necessary step for vehicle sales — actual market entry remains distant and uncertain. The registration filing listed a range of 618 kilometres (384 miles) and a maximum weight of 3,700kg, with Tesla (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. as the manufacturer despite U.S. production. This has sparked speculation about potential future production at Gigafactory Shanghai, though current indications suggest the registration serves to enable imports rather than local manufacturing.

The market fundamentals in China are deeply unfavourable to the Cybertruck. Pickup trucks are classified as commercial vehicles in China rather than passenger vehicles, a regulatory distinction that severely limits their appeal and market access. Numerous city authorities, including Beijing, impose restrictions preventing pickups from accessing urban centres. The segment represents a niche within Chinese automotive markets, where consumers overwhelmingly prefer sedans, SUVs and increasingly, sophisticated electric vehicles from domestic manufacturers like BYD, NIO and XPeng.

Tesla’s broader struggles in China compound the Cybertruck’s challenges. The company’s Chinese sales have declined significantly amid intensifying competition from domestic EV manufacturers. BYD alone sold over 630,000 vehicles for export in the first eight months of 2025, demonstrating the competitive intensity Tesla faces in its second-largest market. The average price of a new car in China fell 19% to approximately 165,000 yuan ($23,000) during the price war that erupted in 2023, a level that makes the Cybertruck’s premium pricing untenable. Chinese manufacturers refresh vehicle models every 1.3 years on average, compared to Western competitors’ 4.2-year cycles, creating relentless competitive pressure that favours rapid iteration over distinctive design statements like the Cybertruck.

Emerging Markets: A Mirage of Opportunity

Tesla has attempted to position emerging markets as salvation for the Cybertruck’s flagging fortunes. In November 2025, over 100 Cybertrucks arrived at a port in South Korea, with Wes Morrill, Tesla’s head of Cybertruck engineering, confirming that an “apocalypse of Cybertrucks” had reached the country. Tesla began accepting South Korean orders in August 2025, with deliveries scheduled to begin by year-end. The company has similarly announced plans to sell Cybertrucks in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and potentially Australia.

These markets, however, represent limited opportunities. The Cybertruck’s pricing in South Korea will be significantly higher than in the U.S. because of import costs, tariffs and market positioning. In the Middle Eastern markets of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, the Cybertruck may find buyers among wealthy consumers seeking vehicles that “really stand out”, but these markets lack the scale to absorb meaningful production volumes. Australia presents regulatory uncertainties similar to Europe, with no confirmed timeline for compliance or market entry.

The Path Not Taken

Elon Musk acknowledged the global challenges in 2020, stating that Tesla would “likely eventually” build a smaller version of the Cybertruck for markets like Europe and China. Five years later, there is no evidence that Tesla has pursued this strategy. The company instead doubled down on the full-size Cybertruck’s radical design, betting that distinctiveness alone would create sufficient demand to justify the enormous development and production investments. That bet has failed spectacularly.

Tesla’s refusal to design the Cybertruck for global markets reflects a deeper strategic rigidity. The company has historically leveraged global platform sharing to achieve economies of scale, producing essentially one car – the same Model 3 and Model Y variants in factories across three continents. This strategy worked brilliantly for mass-market sedans and crossovers. But it has proven catastrophic for a pickup truck designed to American specifications only. The result is a product that can only be sold in a handful of markets, at volumes far below the investment required to develop and produce it.

The Inventory Crisis

The physical manifestation of the Cybertruck’s failure is visible in parking lots across the United States. By mid-2025, Tesla was renting empty lots to store excess Cybertruck inventory, a dramatic reversal for a company that historically operated on negative working capital by collecting customer deposits before vehicles were built. Some unsold Foundation Series Cybertrucks had been sitting in inventory for up to six months by June 2025. In a desperate attempt to move these vehicles, Tesla buffed off the Foundation Series badges to rebrand unsold units as standard models.

The inventory accumulation forced Tesla to introduce increasingly aggressive incentives. The company launched a $70,000 rear-wheel-drive variant in April 2025, only to quietly discontinue it five months later in September. A “Luxe Package” bundling Full Self-Driving software, lifetime Supercharging, Premium Connectivity and premium service was introduced for the Cyberbeast variant, but raised the price by $15,000 at a time when demand was evaporating. Zero per cent financing offers failed to generate meaningful sales momentum. The federal $7,500 tax credit, which became available for the Cybertruck in early 2025, similarly failed to stem the sales decline.

Used car dealers have avoided the Cybertruck entirely, wary of its steep depreciation and uncertain resale demand. This dealer reluctance has created a secondary market collapse, further depressing values and making the vehicles even harder to sell. The vicious cycle — high inventory leading to incentives, which signal weakness, which depresses resale values, which reduces new vehicle demand — is accelerating rather than stabilising.

Tesla recently offloaded 1,000 Cybertrucks stuck in inventory to Musk’s company SpaceX, but he can’t go on indefinitely buying his own cars for which there are no retail customers.

The Manufacturing Stranded Asset

Gigafactory Texas represents one of the largest manufacturing investments in American automotive history. The facility covers 2,500 acres with over 10 million square feet of factory floor, built at enormous cost with the expectation of producing both Model Y crossovers and Cybertrucks at high volume. Tesla would employ over 60,000 workers as production ramped up. Instead, in 2024, the company terminated approximately 2,700 employees — 12% of the factory’s workforce — in one of the largest layoffs in Austin history.

The Cybertruck production lines at Gigafactory Texas are now grossly underutilised. Operating at less than 10% of designed capacity, these lines represent stranded capital that will be difficult to repurpose. Unlike flexible assembly lines that can be retooled for multiple vehicle architectures, the Cybertruck’s unique stainless steel body panels and unconventional manufacturing processes required specialised equipment that has limited alternative uses. The opportunity cost of this investment — capital that could have been deployed on more commercially viable products — will burden Tesla’s returns for years.

The production shutdowns in May and July 2025 nominally allowed for “maintenance and improvements”, but workers reported they were offered paid time off or training rather than production work — a clear indication that demand, not maintenance schedules, drove the shutdowns. These pauses broke the rhythm of continuous production that is essential for manufacturing efficiency, as scheduled maintenance cycles are typically planned quarters or years in advance within just-in-time production systems. The disruption to supplier relationships and workforce morale compounds the financial waste.

WHAT COMES NEXT: THREE SCENARIOS

Scenario One: Managed Decline and Discontinuation

The most likely outcome is that Tesla continues Cybertruck production at drastically reduced volumes for 18-24 months before quietly announcing discontinuation. Production would be maintained at 20,000-30,000 units annually to serve the remaining niche market of enthusiasts. This volume would allow Tesla to claim the Cybertruck remains in production while minimising ongoing losses. Eventually, Tesla would announce that production has ended to make way for next-generation vehicles, or robots, avoiding the admission of outright failure. Existing Cybertrucks would become curiosities, their values stabilising at perhaps 20-30% of original MSRP as collector’s items rather than functional vehicles. This scenario allows Tesla to preserve some brand equity while cutting losses.

Scenario Two: Radical Redesign for Global Markets

Tesla could announce a comprehensive Cybertruck redesign addressing regulatory barriers and market feedback. A “Cybertruck International” variant would feature body panels compliant with modern safety standards, reduced weight to improve efficiency and meet regulatory limits, more conventional proportions suitable for global markets and lower pricing. This would represent an admission that the original design failed but would salvage the Cybertruck nameplate and use existing production lines. Development would require two to three years and billions in investment, with no guarantee of success given the established competition and eroded brand equity. The likelihood of Tesla pursuing this path seems remote given Mr Musk’s historical resistance to admitting product misjudgements.

Scenario Three: Zombie Product Limbo

Tesla maintains minimal Cybertruck production indefinitely — perhaps 10,000-15,000 units annually — treating it as a halo product that generates brand attention rather than meaningful revenue. This approach would be similar to niche sports cars or ultra-luxury vehicles that exist more for marketing than profit. The Cybertruck would be positioned as Tesla’s flagship for innovation and distinctiveness, even as sales remain negligible. This scenario allows Tesla to avoid the negative press of discontinuation while accepting that the vehicle will never achieve commercial success. Production would continue in this diminished state for years, gradually fading from public consciousness as Tesla’s attention shifts to robotaxis, Optimus humanoid robots and other ventures. The Cybertruck becomes a permanent fixture of Tesla’s lineup, but a commercially irrelevant one.

The Broader Implications

The Cybertruck’s failure represents a misreading of global automotive markets by a company that had previously demonstrated exceptional intuition. Tesla’s success with the Model S, Model 3 and Model Y stemmed from correctly identifying underserved segments — luxury electric sedans, affordable long-range EVs and compact electric crossovers — and executing brilliantly despite scepticism. The Cybertruck represents the opposite: creating a product that nobody asked for, designing it in ways that preclude global sales and refusing to adapt when feedback proved negative.

The financial toll will be substantial, but Tesla’s huge financial reserves can weather the storm. Beyond the direct costs of underutilised production capacity and inventory write-downs, the Cybertruck has consumed engineering resources and management attention that could have been directed towards defending Tesla’s core business against intensifying competition. While Tesla concentrated on an indulgent design experiment, BYD and other Chinese manufacturers have relentlessly improved battery efficiency, reduced costs and expanded globally. European manufacturers have launched compelling electric alternatives to the Model 3 and Model Y. Tesla’s market share has eroded in virtually every large market, with particularly severe declines in Europe where the company’s total volume dropped from roughly 326,000 units in 2024 to just over 235,000 in 2025 — a catastrophic 28% decline.

The Cybertruck debacle also highlights the risks of CEO cult of personality. Musk’s insistence on the radical design — overruling apparent internal concerns about its commercial viability — demonstrates the dangers of unchecked executive authority. The lack of apparent market research or willingness to modify the design based on regulatory feedback suggests an organisation where dissent has been suppressed. Tesla’s historical strength has been its willingness to challenge automotive orthodoxy, but the Cybertruck represents the point where iconoclasm became self-destruction.

Extinction, Not Evolution

The evidence says the Cybertruck will never go global. It will not be meaningfully redesigned. It will not achieve commercial success in any market. Instead, it will follow the trajectory of other automotive misjudgements — the Pontiac Aztek, the Chrysler PT Cruiser, the Honda Element — into discontinuation and historical curiosity status. The difference is that Tesla invested far more heavily in the Cybertruck than those manufacturers did in their failures, and Tesla could far less afford the distraction.

The brutal arithmetic is inescapable: Tesla built capacity for 250,000 Cybertrucks annually but is selling fewer than 20,000. The vehicle is effectively banned from Europe and impractical for China. North American sales are in freefall, down 63% from the previous year and accelerating downward.

Depreciation has been catastrophic, average days on a used car lot are up to 150 days because nobody wants a used one, and recalls have been endless. The vehicle has become a symbol of Musk’s increasingly erratic leadership rather than Tesla’s innovation. No amount of marketing can overcome these fundamentals.

The Cybertruck’s fate serves as a cautionary tale about the limits of radicalism and personal folly.

The heartbreak for me is Tesla did what nobody had done before – making electric vehicles desirable to mainstream consumers; the Cybertruck represents the opposite approach, and the market has delivered its verdict. The question now is not whether the Cybertruck will go global or extinct, but how long Tesla will delay acknowledging the obvious answer.  Nobody likes amputating a limb, but if it were to stop contagion spreading and eventual death, the answer would be painfully obvious. But apparently not to Tesla.  Is there anyone in Mr Musk’s orbit who has the position to speak truth to power? History suggests he’ll need to come to that realisation on his own.